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ABSTRACT

Often, in my years as a student and as a writer, I have
heard, and made references to the "voice" in a piece of literature
I've read or perhaps written.

Yet, as common as its use is in

writing and literature classes, we all seem hard pressed to ex

plain precisely what wd're talking about. As Gary SedlaCek ex
plains in his article ''Voices,'' "voice is the most important

element in imaginative writing, the center of the creative

activity." Yet, I. Hashimoto feels that "because the whole notion
of 'voice' is sO mystical and abstract, the term 'voice' may have

become nothing more than a vague phrase conjured up by English
teachers to impress and motivate the oiasses to write more, confess

more, and be happy" ("Voice As Juice").
This thesis is an exploration of thenature of the quality
we call voice, within the framework of a model.

I call this model

a "circumscription," and 1 use the model to help us more

specifically define voice within the context of the relationship
that readers and writers share in the reading and writing

experience. My intention is to waylay many of the vagaries and
misconceptions surrounding the idea of voice, and provide in their
stead a better understanding of the processes and relationships
involved in voice, that enhance our experiences as readers and as
writers.
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Chapter 1:
INTRODUCING THE VAGARIES OF VOICE

W. P. Kinsella writes in a recent New York Times Book Review,

that "It is often ssiid about fiction writing that voice is every

thing.

And what a voice Lee Smith has chosen for 'Fair and Tender

Ladies,' her most ambitious and most fully realized novel to
date;"

Kinsella is of course being complimentary.

He thinks we

should read Smith's book, particularly because it exudes that
elusive quality called voice.
writers strive to achieve.

Voice is good.

Voice is what all

Susan Dodd expresses a similar concept

of voice when she writes in the Fall 1985 issue of The Seattle

Review, about Submitting her"first opus: a novel" to a publisher
in New York.

The publisher's reply to Dodd's work was

astonishing.

Dodd writes, "The verdict was swift and harsh.

Devastating.

And true: 'You haven't found your voice'" (79).

Dodd continues to explain that she still hasn't found a voice to

call her own. She is not alone.

Such a quest for "voice" has

dumb-founded many writers, young and old, experienced and inex
perienced.

Critical essays on composition and creative writing theory

are fraught with references to writer's voice.

But there exists a

striking ambivalence within the writing community as to what voice

in writing actually is.
Peter Elbow, in his book IVriting with Power emphasizes that

the wi'iting that is most fun and rewarding to read is that which

somehow feels more 'real.' The writing which is more 'real' is

that which has a sense of perspnal voice (283). Elbow attempts to
explain voice by describing those writings which have voice and
those that lack it.

In describing those pieces that have voice, he says:

Sometimes it was a particular thought that had greater
conviction, sometimes it was a particular feeling - an
angry happy, sarcastic, or even self-pitying observation
that somehow rang truer than its surroundings. Sometimes
these passages with voice seemed good by other standards,
sometimes they were not good writing at all. Sometimes
they were bupsts of sincerity, but not always....It was
just that they seemed to jump out at me as though suddenly
the writer had switched to a fresh typewriter ribbon.
■ • • ■ ^ (283)

In describing that wliich"has none" he says,
Writing with no voice is dead, mechanical, faceless. It

lacks any sound. Writing with no voice may be sa3dng
something true, important, or new; it may be logically
organized; it may even be a work of genius. But it is
though the words came through some kind of mixer rather
than being uttered by a person. (287)
For Peter Elbow and Susan Dodd, voice represents a quality in
writing; writing that has voice is better than that which doesn't.

This thesis, "The Vagaries of Voice in the Composing Process,"
will explore the nature of that quality.

Where does it originate?

How does the experience of voice happen? Can the writer actually
"choose" voice as Mr. Kinsella suggests?
when no one is actually "speaking"?

Why do we call it voice

Ideally, such an exploration

would conclude with a cledn and concise definition for the quality
in writing that we call voice.

But because we refer to voice as a

quality in this ihstance, reaching a specific definitio is parti
cularly precarious.

Robert Pirsig discusses this problem elqquently when he

writes, "Quality is a characteristic of thought and statement
that is recognized by a non-thinking process. Because definitions
are a product of rigid, formal thinking, qusility cannot be de

fined" (200). It seems that the recognition of voice is purely
idiosyncratic. Such recognition is based on subjective analysis.
That is, it is based on the thoughts and feelings of the observer

rather than the object under cbnsideratipn. The exploration of
voice seems hopeless.

Re^rdless of how hopeless such an exploration seems, we are
still faced with a dilemnm that needs some sense of resolution.

Publishers, critics, composition instructors and creative writing
instructors are being critical of some writing because it lacks
voice.

Susan Dodd's novel was rejected because it lacked voice.

Now what does she do? How does she find it? Is voice something
that can be found (or created) sd all?

In an attempt to draw our attention to this dilemmh. Rise

Axelrod, in a speech given at the College Composition and Communi
cation Conference (March 1987), explained that bur use of voice in

reference to written material is actually a metaphor, and "some
times we take it quite literally and transfer to the written text

many of the qualities we associate with speech.,.such as the ideas

of presence and personality y and the values of audibility and
authenticity" (1). Likewise, Gary Seldacek, in his article
"Voices," quotes the definition for voice from A Handbook of

Modern Rhetorical Terms (Linda Woodson, ed., NCTE, 1979) as "The

imagined sound of a writer's voice that readers encounter in every
written utterance and that leads them to judge their affinity
with, their sympathy for, or their distance from the writer" (48),

thus supporting

Axelrod's contention that voice in writing is a

metaphor for the spoken word.
However, the metaphor is more complicated than our first

assumptions allow,

Axelrod is essentially clearing the dust from

the dinosaur rib we are unearthing.

The metaphor of voice has

multiple layers; voice is used in a variety of contexts.

On one

level voice is sound, on another level voice is power.

In his article "Chapter and Verse," Stanley Plumly uses voice
in several of these contexts.

In one example, he explains, "the

poet's voice, his way of presiding over his material...whether
[in] terms of those of a persona or one of a trinity of personal
pronouns, is inevitable.

The question is never one of the fact of

a voice, but of the effective control or disclosure of that voice"

(21). In this instance, Plumly is using voice as a metaphor of
the first "layer." It is a simple metaphor, the voice in a poem is

equal to the sound of the poet's speaking voice. Any writing
sample will contain voice in this instance, no matter how "dead.

mechanical, [or] faceless."

This is in direct contradiction with

the quality that Elbow attempts to distinguish in his discussion
about voice.

Later in the article Plumly says, ''[the poet's] voice pre
sides as a participant," and "the voice...pokes through con
sistently to qualify and comMeht...the voice itself becoines the

hero of the story" (28). What specific entity or quality coUld he
possibly be talking about in this instance?

Voice has become

somathing different from the imagined sound of the poet's spoken
words. It seems now, that Plumly recognizes voice as an entity or

consciousness in its own right which is distinguishable and which

possesses volition. Plumly continues by explaining that "in free
verse...the voice is more available and therefore more vulnerable"

(25). Voice seems to have become a metaphor for the being or
essence behind one's spoken words.
Such references to voice contribute to our frustration and

confusion. In Plumly's article, voice is no longer simply an
element of writing, it has become a metaphysical quality.

No

wonder references to or about voice are indefinite and vague. The
discussion about voice is a discussion in metaphysics.

However, if we look to demystify or clarify voice, not by

defining it, but by providing boundaries to what we might mean
when we speak of voice, perhaps voice as a quality of writing can
be made more manageable, less abstract. A common term in geometry
is circumscription, which means to draw a circle around a geo

metric figure, touching the circle to the figure at as many points
as possible. While we may not be able to produce exact measure

ments (definitions), or an exact circle (we're talking meta
physics, not mathematics), perhaps we can provide a circumscrip

tion for voice as a power in writing. We can encircle it and give
it form.

The aim of this discussion is to provide the points of

that circumscription. Perhaps in this way, we can responsibly use
the term voice in discussing written material.
This circumscription begins with the nature of the relationship
that the reader and writer share in the reading and writing
experience. The quality, voice, cannot happen outside the context

of this relationship.

In the reading and writing experience, all

there is, is relationship.

In this way, the idea of human rela

tionship is interwoven and, in a sense, provides the context for
the discussion of voice.

It is the thin Une that encircles the

concept of voice, and which finally gives voice its form.
Peter Elbow, in Writing With Power explains that "the

essential act at the heart of writing is the act of giving" (his
emphasis, 20).

There can be no writing without a reader, just as

there can be no gift without someone receiving it.

This rela

tionship is reminiscent of the question, if a tree falls in the

forest and no one is there to hear, does the falling tree make any
noise?

Theoretically speaking, if no one (including the writer as

reader) reads a written work, has any writing actually been done?
However, it goes beyond a tree falling and an ear hearing. In

reading and writing, there is intention.

There is a person writ

ing with a purpose, and there is a person reading with a purpose
(even when the reader is the writer his or her self).

So not only

is the concept of voice based within a relationship, it is predi
cated upon the notion of intention within that relationship.

Point one in voice's circumscription is intention.

Point two has to do with context.

We often emphasize the

process in writing and reading, as opposed to a product or result,
yet we treat this process as an isolated event: isolated from the

sense of self in each participant, and isolated from the

assumptions, the predispositions, a writer and a reader might
bring to that process.

Within the relationship where voice is

created, there are at least two types of participants (even though
these two may be the same individual who takes on the role of one

participant and then another).

The predispositions of each parti

cipant will help determine whether or not voice is created and/or
recognized.

The best place to begin is with the obvious. A reader reads,
and a writer writes.

Chapters Two and Three of this thesis will

examine phenomena surrounding the reading and writing experience.
Each of these involves more than putting words onto paper and
reading words on paper. Each is involved in a process of thinking
and acting, which provides the context for relationship.

To complicate the issue further, each participant in this

writing/reading scenario plays multiple roles.

A writer reads or

listens, and a reader writes or speaks.

In The Barbarian Within,

Walter Ong explains that "as he composes his thoughts in words, a
speaker or writer hears these words echoing within himself...as
though he were another person" (51). In an acceptable sense, the

writer listens, or reads, while composing. Within each writer

there exists a duality of experience. The writer might experience
a self to some degree as the one who formulates and expresses

ideas, but she will also experience "the shadow of a 'thou'" (Ong
52), or "other" within herself who experiences and evaluates what
has been written.

Ong explains that this sense of other is

essential to the communicative act which writing represents. The
writer becomes part of, or "participates in the other to whom he

speaks, and it is this underljdng participation which makes
communication possible" (52).

Similarly, the reader also experiences an "other." There is
the imagined writer, who is a construct of what the reader knows

of the author, and the reader's own inner speaking which is
audible as the reader reads.

As proponents of Reader Response

criticism are quick to explain, the reader actually creates the
text, and becomes an author as he/she reads.

As Stanley Fish ex

plains in his essay"Literature in the Reader," "it is the exper

ience of an utterance... that is its meaning" (78). The ex
perience that creates meaning belongs to the reader.
The final point of the circumscription of voice is an
exploration of our (the reader's and writer's) relationship with

a

language.

Since the relationship between a reader and writer is

constructed solely within language, understanding how we use and

conceive of language will be critical in examining the concept of
voice, which is created within this reader/Writer relationship.
The model for our circumscription of voice is more
easily pictured like this:

Context

Intention

Chapter 1

Chapter 1
Chapter 2

Chapter 2

Voice

u

h
N»!

Language

Chapter 3

Chapter Two, "The Writer Writing/Reading," will examine the
writer, who he or she conceives of him/herself to be, and what he
or she might contribute in generating the experience of voice.
Chapter Three, "The Reader Reading/Writing" will examine the
reader in the same fashion.

Chapter Four is reserved for an

exploration of our relationship with language, and will address
the question of why we seek voice in written material, and how
such a power as voice is determined within the context of the

previous chapters' discussions about the reader and writer.

All

this is an attempt to Waylay many of the vagaries and

misconceptions surrounding the idea of voice, and provide in their
stead a better understanding of the processes and relationships
involved in voice that enhance our experiences as readers and as
writers.
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Chapter 2:
THE WRITER WRITING/READING

We begin this exploration with the question, is there any
thing the writer can do to create voice?

To answer this we must

examine the writing situation. This examination quickly evolves
into an exploration of the context of the writing situation for
the the writer.

The moment we ask about the writing situation, we

must make assumptions about who the writer is, and what that

writer might bring to particular rhetorical contexts.

In ex

ploring the generation of voice, we must ask questions about what

generates and where this generation evolves from.

By assuming

voice is an actual occurence in writing we assume there is a
speaker from whom that voice emerges. (This assumption reveals

the logocentricity that Professor Axelrod referred to when she
talked about transferring the ideas of presence and personality to
the written text, and later in Chapter 4, we will exsunine how such

logic might be problematic for us.) We associate voice in writing
with a particular consciousness or presence.

There are various prompts for writing, (prompt as distinct

from purpose, which stays with the writer throughout the writing
process).

The prompt is the initial impetus that sets the writer
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writing, that causes the writer to set pen to paper. It is the

experience of this prompt that immediately places the writer in
the Writing predicament.

For a situdent, the usual prompt is a class assignment. Often

writers use writing to help them think. Writers write to be pub
lished. Writers write to communicate.

Some writers write for the

sheer beauty of words and rhythm. Poets often write in apprecia

tion of an event or thing that is thought-provoking or beautiful.

Regardless of the prompt for writing, most of the thinking that
occurs before setting pen to paper (or hand to keyboaird) surrounds
the topic to be discussed or presented.

One of the first concerns

for a writer is often whether or not she has enough knowledge or
Skill to write about her topic, and then, how she is to present

her topic for a reader. In any rhetorical or artistic situation,
the writer is immediately thrown into the role of "giver" or
presenter. Without the writer putting words on paper, the rela
tionship between a reader and a writer can't happen.

As Elbow

explains, "the essential human act at the heart of writing is the
act of giving'V (20).

Regardless of the rhetorical situation, the writer is in a

predicament when faced with a,blank page. The writer is "on the
line" so to speaks

She must give something. There are

assumptions she will have about herself and her topic, and her
purpose for writing, that create the context in which she will be

writing; that determine her ability to give.
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Vulnerability is the

tail side to the coin of ^ying. It is this state of
vulnerability that teachers often refer to when they ask for
"honest" or "authentic" writing. William Coles demonstrates this

sort of dialogue in his book The Plural I. In speaking with a
student he says.

Now just tell it the way you'd tell it. Just use your
own voice, not a manner or a style you've borrowed, just
be you, something somebody couldn't imitate, or couldn't
imita.t6 easily. sCan ypu do that?

[The student] smiled, "I haven't been able to do it so
far." (41)
This situation is an immediate problem for a writer in the

academic environment, because more often th£in not, the writer is

being judged on her ability to give; she is being judged on her
skill as a Writer.

When one is giving of oneself, as Elbow claims

all writing is, it is difficult to separate the self from that
which is given. The writing situation is threatening for the
student writer. When placed in the academic environment, often
students will lack the sense of autonomy that allows them to "take

full responsibility for [their] words" (Elbow 22).
Addressing the problems of the writer's autonomy or sense of
self as part of the context in which the writer will write, meets
additional problems when we start to consider just exactly who or
what that self reedly is. Joseph Harris, in his article "The
Plural Text/The Plural Self: Roland Barthes and Williams Coles"

writes,

Real eloquence is honest; the best pi>ose is the most
natural. The problem with such a view is that it reduces
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writing to a simple test of integrity; Either your guts
are out there on the page or they're not.... Seen this

way, the advice to be yourself starts to seem dogmatic,
bullying, for it assumes that writers already have a self
somewhere, ready-made, that they merely need to make their
prose reflect and express. (161)
Suddenly, it seems that the writer must first assume a role

or identity for herself before she can write and, in the context

of writing, become a vulnerable, giving person.

While this sounds

like a difficult task, any writer actually does this whenever he
or she sits down to write.

Out of a basic, subliminal reaction to

the writing predicament, the writer creates a self.

This happens

in each instance of writing, from grocery lists to love letters,
from novels to a note left on a friend's car.

And the nature of

this "writing" self is directly related to who the writer presumes
the reader to be.

This self is dictated by the rhetorical situ

ation. By simply acknowledging an "other" (or reader, who may be
the writer herself), a writer creates a "non-other."

The writer

creates a self.

In continuing the discussion of the nature of the writer's
self, William Coles contends that"writing is not simply a tool we
use to express a self we already have; it is the means by which we

form a self to express" (161). The process of writing is the

process of becoming. It would seem that voice might not neces
sarily result from a writer's "self" expression, but may be that
which creates a sense of self for the writer.

Writers don't

create voice; voice (well crafted written language?) creates the
sense of a person who is the writer.
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But the question remains, what is the relationship of the
nature of this self, to whether or not voice occurs in the

writer's writing?

As the nature of the writer's self is a criti

cal factor in creating the context in which the writing will

occur, the nature of this self may be critical in creating voice.
Sondra Perl's explorations in the nature of the composing
process might offer some insight into this question.

She touches

upon the relationship the writer's self may have to voice with her

notion of ''felt sense.'' Perl conducts an experiment in which she

studies writers composing. From her observations she notes:
There seems to be a basic step in the process of
composing that skilled writers rely on even when they are
unaware of it...This [step] seems to rely on very careful
attention to one's inner reflections....When it's

working, this process allows us to say or write what we've
nevec said before, to create something new and fresh, and
occasionally it provides us with the experience of"new
ness" or "freshness," even when "old words" or images are
used. (366)

According to Perl, one's abiiity to"listen" to one's inner voice
is directly related to whether or not a writer is able to create

"freshness" and "newness

even with old words. The quality of

this "inner voice" will be determined largely by who the writer
assumes herself to be.

If the writer is unable to create herself

as knowledgeable or insightful, she will be unable to "hear"

knowledge or insight or "newness" (all, perhaps, elements of

voice). A writer's inability to "hear" may be critical in
understanding why a writer's writing results in "dead, mechanical,
faceless" prose (or poetry).
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So there are perhaps two factors that we can distinguish from

Perl's experiments that may be critical to the writer creating
voice (if the writer actually can create voice).

The first re

lates to the writer's ability to create an identity that thinks in
an engaging, provocative manner; the second relates to the

writer's ability to "hear" and then transmit that new, provocative
"inner voice" to the page.
Earlier in this discussion about the writer's created self, I

mentioned that the nature of this self is directly correlated to
who the writer assumes the reader to be, and that by acknowledging

an"other," the writer creates a "non-other" or self.

If the

nature of this self is a factor in considering how a writer
creates voice, thein possibly the writer's conception of the
"other," or reader, may play an equally important role.

In quoting The Notebooks ^ Henry James in The Rhetoric of
Fiction. Wayne Booth says "as the young James had long before
said, what the author does is to 'make his reader very much as he

makes his characters...when he makes {the reader] well, that is,
makes him interested, then the reader does quite half the labor'"

xm.

V

j;,

Later Booth asserts that it is not possible to write without
the reader in mind.; Even an atithbr who claims to write "for

himself," can only do so "if he imagines himself temporaidly as
his own reader, approaching his work without special knowledge"

■(loa). ■
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In a sense, there are two readers in the rhetorical situa

tion.

One is a living, breathing human being, "upon whose crossed

knee rests the open volume, and whose personality is as complex
and ultimately inexpressible as any dead poet's" (Gibson 266).

It is this reader that Richard Hugo cautions us about when he
:writes.

Never worry about the reader, what the reader
can understand. When you are writing, glance over your
shoulder, and you'll find there is no reader. Just you
and the page. Feel lonely? Good. (Triggering Town 5)
Booth, however, is talking about the second type of reader.
Walker Gibson calls this reader the "mock reader" ("Authors,

Speakers, Readers, and Mock Readers").

Essentially, the mock

reader is the reader who is a construct of the writer's imagina

tion (and later, the reader's imagination as discussed in the
following chapter, "The Reader Reading/Writing"). It is this
reader that Henry James refers to when he talks about making the
reader well.

It doesn't matter whether this individugil actually

exists, although in imagining this reader, the writer hopes to
come as close as possible to an actual person.

What matters is

that the writer, in his or her own mind, has a partner with whom

to have the reading/writing relationship.

How the writer

"creates" this partner, in his own imagination, may directly in
fluence the quality of the discourse the writer presents.

So the

question we must address in examining voice is, how does the
writer "write" the reader well?

According to Jeunes, our ability to "make the reader" contri

17

butes tremendously to our ability to write "with intensity"
(Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction. 42). Probably one of the

biggest contributions a writer can make, in creating high quality
in the reader/writer relationship, is for the writer to create the

"mock reader" in as close an approximation as possible to the
actual reader, or to create that "mock reader" a person who the
actual reader would want to be.

Accomplishing such a phenomenal task as creating a "mock
reader" who is a close approximation of the actual reader who

might read our writing poses a huge problem for writers

(especially those who might take Hugo's advice on not considering
the reader when writing). It means that a writer must ultimately
be interested in others, or at least in the world around him. The
writer must know actual readers in order to create"mock readers"

well. In order to be interesting, the writer must be interested.
In Writing With Power. Peter Elbow touches upon the notion of

creating the reader well, when he tedks about "breathing
experience into words" (314).

He contends:

The crucial fact about reading, then, is that the
reader is engaged at every moment in making a choice of
whether to inveist the energy required to have the actual
experience implied in the words, or merely to read the
directions for constructing an experience...if you want

readers to breathe Ufe into your writing so that they get
a powerful experience from it, then you must breathe
experience into your words as you write (317 and 322).

It is the writer's "job" to write in such a way that readers
wiU make that investment of energy to "breath life" into the
words on the page.
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"Breathing life" into words however sounds nearly as bullying
as "be yourself" or "be interesting." How does one breathe life
into words? Richard Hugo cautioned "against conimunication because

once language exists only to convey information, it is dying"
(11). How do we keep language from dying on the page? I think
Hugo starts to answer this question, when he advises "somehow you
must switch your allegiance from the triggering subject to the

worda" (12). We must become adept at knowing the impact of our
sentence structures and word choices on a reader.

We must become

conscientious about what we are asking the reader to do, then
forget it during the writing process.

We must practice so that

the form becomes part of who we are, so that we can write well

without thinking abpnt iti This is what Richard Lanham refers to
as "trained intuition" (114).

At one point in The Triggering Town

Hugo stresses the importance of practice in training one's self to
write.

He says "once a spectator said, after Jack Nicklaus had

chipped a shot in fi?om a sand trap, 'That's pretty lucky.'
Nicklaus is supposed to have replied, 'Right.
more I practice, the luckier I get" (17).

But I notice the

To train our intuition

about readers, we must practice, both through human interraction

and through writing. The writer's self must be trained in intui
tion.

Establishing a good relationship with the reader is not a

matter of luck.

In a sense, what this discussion is aimed toward is the

importance of the writer's awareness of, and ability to write
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within, his or her "discourse community" (Fish "Interpreting").
Each rhetorical situation is embedded within the larger context of
a particular community.

The college student writes papers for

college professors, instructors and students, who are reading
within the context of an academic setting.

Fiction writers are

writing within a certain genre that dictates what they can write
and still be called fiction writers, and what fiction readers

expect. Poets must write within certain agreed upon parameters if
they still want to be considered poets by their readers.

But simple knowledge or understanding of the genre or
rhetorical situation is not enough for the writer to create voice.

Surely Susan Dodd is aware of her discourse community and is

probably very knowledgeable about her medium. If creating voice
is related to the writer's relationship with the reader and how
the writer creates the reader, what is that fine line that the

writer must cross with the reader, in order to enter the realm of
voice?

Most critics and readers will agree that the experience of

voice has something to do with accessibility. Somehow the writer
as a person is more present, more "there," more accessible for the

reader. However the idea of accessibility is just as vague and
abstract as the notion of voice.

The notion of accessibility reminds me of an incident in a

graduate fiction workshop at the University of Montana, in which
Barry Hann^ told a student that the story the student had written
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was boring. When the student asked how he might make it more
interesting, Hannah replied, "be more interesting yourself!" Be
sides being a bully, is Hannah also referring to the notion that
the writer must create an interesting, "voiced" self, in order to

be interesting and to have voice? Have we come full circle, back
to the writer's creation of the self?

The whole exploration of the nature of the writer's self and

who the writer conceives the reader to be, is an exploration of
context. It has to do with the often inchoate assumptions the

writer brings to his relationship with the reader, that may deter
mine the quality of that relationship. When we say we have

experienced voice in a written work, we are also commenting on
the quality of the relationship we feel with the writer.

When we

experience voice in writing, we perceive an"other" with whom we

want to be related. The experience of voice however, belongs to

the reader, and there are assumptions which the reader also brings
to this relationship that may determine his ability to experience

voice. The question of context and intention in the reading
experience, is the focus of the next chapter, "The Reader

Reading/Writing."
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Chapter 3:
THE: READER READING/WRITING

We have determined that voice occurs within a dynamic inter

relationship between a wi?iter v Teader a

language they share.

While Chapter 2 explored the role of the writer in generating
voice within the framework of this relationship, Chapter 3 will

question what the reader might contribute to the generation of
voice. Just as the context of the writing experience was an

important factor in exploring how a writer might generate voice,
the rhetorical context of the reading experience is also important

in exploring how a reader might contribute to the experience of
voice.

A reader is influenced by a variety of factors:

his or

her language system, literary competence, ego, and discourse com
munity will all help determine his or her experience of a text.

In his essay "The Rhetoric of Blindness," Paul de Man

explains that reading "is an act of understanding that can never
be observed, nor in any way prescribed or verified" ("Blindness"

107). Some critics such as Stanley Fish, argue that the writer
has Little to do with the reader's experience of a text, and in
fact the "influence" between the text and reader is more the

reverse of what we most commonly assume. Textual devices, or
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"formal units

Fish writes;

are always a function of the interpretative model one
brings to bear; they are not 'in' the text, and I would
make the same argument for [the author'si intentions....

An intention.,.is made when perceptual or interpretive
closure is hazarded; it is verified by [the reader's]
interpretive act, and I would add, it is not verifiable in
any other way. ("Interpreting" 176)

As he States, the formal unit or "text" is always a function

of the reader's interpretation. The reader"influences" the text,
and not vice versa. Fish further argues agmnst the notion that

the text as an object at 8dl. lie states;
The great merit... of kinetic art is that it forces you

to be aware of"it" as a changing object— and therefore
no "object" at all -- and also to be aware of yourself as
correspondingly changing...In its operation it makes
inescapable the actualizing role of the observer,
literature is a kinetic art, but the physical form it
assumes prevents us from seeing its essential nature« even

though"re so experience it. (''literature" 83)

If the reading '^encounter" is so solitary in nature, relying

i:

strictly on the consciousness of the one being (reader) and com

pletely non-obsenvable by any"other," what is it in reading that
allows us the experience of another to whom we attribute Jiice?
Could it be that in reading we are faced with an existen __

dilemma? We want to believe there is an other sneaking. an|d that
We are not alone with our experience. Richard Hugo's adTOce to

"glance over your shoulder, and you'll find there is no render"

can also apply to the 3?eader in his or her experience of th|i
writer. Perhaps when:we speak of voice, we are really reacting
to the possibility, in true Derridean fashion, that thera is|no
actual voice. As Fish explains, "there is more to [reading]| that
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is, to its experience, than meets the casual eye" ("Literature"

77). In the final analysis, any "observation" or discussion of
the reading process(w^hich "cannot be prescribed or verified") is
metaphysical.

Texts do not speak.

How is it that we hear them?

In his chapter "How to Get Power Through Voice," in Writing
With Power, Peter Elbow says a curious thing. He advises student

writers to "practice re"Wsing lor voice." He says, "this is
really an exercise in adjusting the breath in the words till it

guides the reader's voice naturally to each pause and full stop"
(emphasis mine 305).

The phi^e, "reader's voice" almost slips by

unnoticed, but not quite.

Elbow's book focuses on the writing

process, so what does he mean when he speaks of the reader's

voice? How does it differ firam the writer's voice? Or does it?
What are the elements

within?

How do these

in the context that the reader operates

elements influence the reading experience?

Before we can address the problem of a reader's voice, we
must first ask, who is the reader?

Earlier, when discussing the

writing process, we considered that perhaps the reader doesn't
exist for the wnriter es cept as an extension of the writer's own

consciousness. Who exactly are we thinking about when we say
"reader," and what dees this have to do with voice?

To begin with, there can be no voice without hearing just as
there can be no hearing without sound. Jacques Oerzida writes:
to speak to someone is doubtless to hear oneself speak,

T oneself; but, at the same time, if one is
heard by anottier, to speak is to make him repeat

to be heard b

immediately in himself the hearing-oneself-speak in the
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very form in which I effectuated it. (Speech and Phenomena
80)

Likewise, when reading, the reader repeats "immediately in
himself the hearing-oneself-speak" as a t3rpe of listening. When
reading, the reader ci-eates an inner dialogue by first "speaking"
a fictitious, authorial presence (thus creating an inner authorial
voice), and in so doing, "hears" what is being spoken. A speak
ing/listening duo occurs at the moment a reader interracts with
written words.

The r
[•eader

then, is the one who "processes" sound

into intelligibility. In turn, the reader "is to some extent
processed by the method that uses him as a control" (Fish

"Literature" 87). This "method" is nothing less than the ling
uistic and literary conventions which the writer and reader share.

Walker Gibson discusses the idea of the reader being
processed by the text, in his article "Authors, Speakers, Readers,
and Mock Readers." Gibson claims that, in the reading experience,
"we are recreated by 1;he language. We assume for the sake of

experience, that set of attitudes and qualities which the language
asks Us to assume" (265).

Similarly, George; Poulet writes that

reading, then is the act in which the subjective prin
ciple which I call I, is modified in such a way that I no
longer have the right, strictly speaking, to consider it
as my I.... Who, when I say I, is indeed that I? (57)
While this seems to be in direct contradiction with Fish's idea

that it is the reader who influences the text, and not vice versa,

the two notions can be reconciled if we look at the reading
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experience as and exchange or interraction.
The reader brings many factors, both conscious and uncon

scious, to this "processing for inteiligLbtlity."

The reader

makes meaning by engaging an understanding or mastery (in the
sense of dance and d ancer being one) of "the phonological,

syntactic and semanti systems of his [or her] language" (Culler

101).

Culler continues that this mastery
enables [tle reader] to convert the sounds into

to recognize words, and to assign a
structural description and interpretation to the resulting
sentence, ev€ n though it be quite new to him. Without
this implicit i nowledge, this internsilized grammar, the
discrete units

sequence of sounds does hot speak to him. (101)
A reader is

someone who has mastered the technique of a

particular language, someone who has mastered the language system.
The reader, in the sense that he or she embodies a particular

language system, is the "process" in "processing for

intelligibility". The static identity or ego is preempted by
process.

As with writing, the act of reading is likewise, the act

of becoming.
The elements thsit come to bear on this process may differ

from one reader to the next (each individual is essentially a
unique process) in that each reader harbors a unique history.

Linguistic competence, literary competence, and individual history
will all act to comprise the nature of the pi^icess that the reader

becomes. These elemients

all work to influence the reader's ex

pectations and projeclions for the text.

Allen Harris explains

"we each listen with our own peculiar collection of strategies.
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biases and desires, our own bundle of motives, and we understand

only as a function of that immensely Gomplex bundle. One of the
implications of this situation is that we do not hear precisely

the same things" (172). Could this mean that some of us may hear
voice, while other readers will not?

Most often when we use the term voice with regard to written
material, it is in the GonteXt of evaluation or judgement. In
faot, it is impossible to speak of voioe out of experience and not
out of reflection of experience. Essentially, we Uve in

different worlds of experience, but rarely make the distinction.
Recently, I sat in on a seminar delivered by Werner Erhard, in

which Erhard discussad this very concept, using the game of tennis
to demonstrate his point. In the example, Erhard explained that
tennis resdly provides I the arena for two worlds of sport — that

of the player, and that of the spectator. No one would argue that
skill is not a major factor in any such competition, yet we never
question just where exactly that skill occurs. Is skill a

function of the tennis I player, or a function of the spectator? It
seems obvious that it is the player who posseses skill.

He or she

is skillful. A problem arises however, when we ask the player to
show us his or her sl^. What we might get is a strong backhand
shotj or some quick foot work but the player will not be able to

show us skill. This ijs because skill is a function of the
spectator— it belongs in the stands, not on the court.

The

moment a player focuses his or her attention on being skillful, he
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or she is no longer playing tennis — is no longer "in the game"
so to speak. The player is hoW "outside" play, judging and
evaluating his or her pwh actions.

For anyone who has experienced

being a master tennis player, or dancer, or pianist, or even

writer, the experience while playing, dancing or writing, is that
of being absent from the task. It is the experience of becoming
(or being) the task. :Once our attention is focused away from the

task, we can no longeb be One with it. We have become spectators.
Skill does not exist "dut there" in the tennis player. It is
present only as a function of reflection, evaluation or specula
tion.

Similarly, when reading we have an experience.

Should we

stop to reflect on that experience, we are no longer reading, we
are reflecting on reading.

If I stop to ask about voice in a

poem, I am no longer in the experience of the poem. I am "in the
stands" so to speak.

Most often, the writing to which we attri

bute voice, is that which we are able to lose ourselves in — we

become the experience as opposed to the reflection of the
experience.

When in the experience, the "I" that I Consider

myself to be, ceases to exist.

When the dancer and the dance

become one, the dancer ceases to exist as such. To speak of voice

is really to speak of the experience of spectatorship, not the
■i .

experience of reading;

•

;

■

.

'

.

■

■

The devices each of us bring to the

reading experience will determine the nature of our "spectatorship."

As members of particular discourse communities each of us
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will come loaded with our own "bundle" of expectations and pur
poses that will lead us to determine whether or not voice has been
achieved.

I

The phenomenology of how understanding (which is a recursive,

reflective act) can possibly occur in the reading process — in

the interraction between words (signs), phenomeneil presence (sig
nified) and consciousness, is mind boggling, even in its most
simplified form.

Consider the following example. The first stanza of Richard

Hugo's poem "The Lady in Kicking Horse Reservoir" reads:
Not my hands but green across you now.
Green tons hold you down, and ten bass curve
teasing in your hair. Summer sUme
will pile deep on your breast. Four months of ice
will keep you firm. I hope each spring
to find you tangled in those pads
pulled not quite loose by the spillway pour,
stars in dead Reflection off your teeth.
On the surface, it seems that each word directs us as to what

we should conceptualize. Each sign represents an image or a
relationship to other images, which we are to visualize as we

pronounce (or read) the words.

A reader considers each sign in

relation to the other signs in order to create a new image. This
concept seems simple enough.

However, if we consider the word

"green," this simplicity gasps. Hugo writes "not my hands but
green across you now/Green tons hold you down." Somehow we know

that Hugo means something different with each instance of green.

The first is taken as an adjective/verb, and the second is clearly
an adjective.

Signification as a logical phenomenon breaks down
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in this instance. The;same word "green" means several different
things in the context of the first two lines.

With the first

"green" I see the color green, and I see sweeping motion
(actually, I see a hand sweeping across an inner, visual screen).

With the first green, the reader makes the illogical substitution

of "sweep" for "greenj" Hugo could have written "not my hands but
sweep across you npw^" but the sound and the connotative value of
the verb Would alter the line's effect on a reader. "Green

across" is much more eerie than "sweep across."

Part of this effect can be accounted for by the fact that
''green'' ends with a soft (what is often referred to in creative
writing circles as femimne) sound, whereas "sweep" ends on a
much stronger note. In the context of the line and the vision

Hugo intends, "green" is a much more appropriate verb, even though
it is used incorrectly as a verb. "Not ray hands but green across

you now," gives me chills. "Not my hands but sweep across you
now," and I say "interesting, what's next?" How can we account

for this difference in effect, strictly on the basis of sound?
Ip his article ''Deconstructibh and Linguistic Analysis,"

Ronald Schleifer explains that isolating one term, such as I have
done with "green" is misleading, and that we must consider a word

in the context of its sentence. He says, "to consider a term as
simply the union of a certain sound with a certain concept... is
grossly misleading. To define it in this way would isolate the
term from its system" (383). But it seems in this instance, the
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system breaks down, or else it is more complex and perhaps more
imbedded in subconsciousness than our first assumptions allow.

Why does the word "^een," in its use as a yerb, have the effect
on me that could not be created had Hugo used the word "sweep?"
How can we account for this overall change in effect due to the
minute change (or exchange) of one word for another, within a

system? Meaning, and hence the whole system, appears to be
changed by this one Substitution.

In essence, the system is changed with each individual

reader's "processing.'! The problem with the above analysis is
that it is my analysisV As Hugo's reader I share a linguistic (we
both have mastered English), literary (we both understand and
embody an individual level of competence with poetic form) and

even personal history; with Hugo that cannot be duplicated by any
of his other readers. ; My processing for intelligibility has a
quantity (as far as shared "systems" and history with the writer)
and quality that is urliqUe.

Richard Hugo's writing has a

tremendous "voice/' but only to the degree that that voice can be
experienced as such by the process that his reader becomes.

The

voice we hear in Hugo's poetry is in essence, a construct of

shared "knowledge" bietween Hugo and his reader.

Jonathan Culler refers to an aspect of such shared knowledge
as "convention" in his essay "Literary Competence." He claims:
The work has structure and meaning because it is read
in a particular way...potential properties ...are
actualized by the theory of discourse applied in the act
of reading. (102)
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He demonstrates the importanee of such conventions by
suggesting we consider a, common line of prose from a newspaper or

novel, and set it down on a page in a poetic form. The linguistic
qualities of the line will remain unchanged but
the different meanings which the text acquires can
not... be attributed to one's knowledge of the language
but must be ascribed to the special conventions for

reading poetry which lead one to look at the language in
new ways... tp subject the text to a different series of
interpretive operations. (103)

Convention itself functions as a sign for a competent or
"informed" (as Fish refers to it) reader.

The notion of

convention suggests a communal or public signification -- some

thing that is understood in the same way, by each individusil
member of a discourse community. When convention is not an aspect

of the reading processi, writing is perceived as lifeless or non
sensical.

For example, several years ago my father asked to see a book

of poems I was reading. He read several poems then handed the
book back to me without comment.

T considered these to be

extraordinary poems (David Wojahn's Icehouse Lights), and didn't

see how my father couldn't share my feelings. The poems did not
"Speak" to him in the same way that they "speak" to me. He did

not share the conventions of reading poetry so the poems seemed
simplistic and inane to him.

He could not "hear" them in the seime

way that someone versCd in literary conventions might hear them.
I then read some of the poems out Ibud to him, after which he

said, "Oh, I get it.

That's nice." Somehow, he had been unable
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to provide the "voice"! when he read the poems to himself.

When I

provided that "voice" by reading the poems out loud, the poems
took oh new dimmensions.

There are several factors then, that we must consider in

determining how a reader might create or hear voice in a text.

The first has to do with the text itself, and the rhetorical
forces brought to bear upon the reader by the writer. If the
writer somehow requires the reader to become someone he does not

wish to bej the reader will probably not even finish reading the
text, let alone perceive the quality called voice.

Walker Gibson

writes, "A bad book, then, is a book in whose mock reader we

discover a person we refuse to become, a rnask we refuse to put on,
a role we will not play" (268). The text must be written in such

a way that the reader allows himself to become the "mock reader,"
and establish a relationship with who he perceives the writer to
be..- 

A second factor in whether or not a reader hears voice has to

do with the reader's purpose for reading and the reader's expecta

tions of the text. Is the reader looking for, or"listening" for,
voice? This will be determined by the reader's identity as a
member of a particular discourse community.

Voice is a sOphisticiated notion. A reader of Hemingway, for
instance, will not consider Hemingway's voice if that reader is
not versed in literary terminology.

Voice is an element of

"practitioner lore," which is"The accumulated body of traditions.
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practices, and beliefs jin terms of which practitioners understand

how writing is done, Ijearned, and taught" (North 22). When we use
the term voice with rejgard to writing, we are identifying our
■.

.

'

,■

■

■

■ I

■

■

■

'

selves as members of the literary community.

.

We distinguish

ourselves as "insiders" (Kermode). According to Frank Kermode,
"to divine the true, the latent sense, you need to be of the

elect, of the institution" (3), and later, "there is seeing and
hearing, which are what naive listeners and readers do; and there
is perceiving and understanding, which are in principle reserved
to an elect..." (3).

Being an "insider" (for Kermode) is not simply a matter of
being more knowledgeable about literature and reading than the

"outsider"; it is about acquiring particular sensitivities to the
reading experience.

One such "sensitivity" is for what we call

voice.

Because voice refers to an experience and not necessarily to
a verifiable fact, voice belongs in the domain of readerhood.
Each reader's complex "bundle" of motives and desi^s will contri
bute or detract from the experience we call voice.

Both the

reader and writer are essentially created by the linguistic exper
ience — each is a "process of becoming" in the reading/writing
interaction. In the following chapter, we will explore language
as the context in which this interaction develops.
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Chapter 4:
OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH LANGUAGE:
A DECONSTRUCTION OF VOICE

The relationship that the reader and writer share, and which

seems to actually create, to a certain extent, the identity of
each within that relationship, is based in language. So while the

assumptions and beliefs that the writer and reader each bring to
the writing/reading experience determine the effect of that

experience on each individual, the entire relationship takes place

within a much larger context: language. The noted psychiatrist
and philosopher Jacques Lacan argues that our experience of all

reality is predicated within language.

The influence of language

effects and the mastery of convention is what voice is all about.
It is also what rhetoric is all about.

In his preface to

Derrida's Speech and Phenomena, Newton Garver states "rhetoric is
thus not a natter of pure form but has to do with the relation of

language to the world (to life) through the relation of linguistic
expressions to the specific circumstances in which their use makes

sense" (x). Similarly, Marshall Alcorn argues in "Rhetoric,
Projection, and the Authority of the Signifier":
Texts are not purely the product of a reader's projec
tion. Texts have particular properties of their own.
These particular properties, however, do not exist as
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categories of referential meaning; they exist as something
we might call rhetoric... [we are encoui*aged] to hypothe

size a relation between the projective forces brought to
bear upon the!text by the reader and the rhetorical forces

brought to bear upon the reader by the text... when we
encounter rhetoric in texts, we encounter the forces at

tached to words that generate, employ, or "bind" emotion.
(147-48)

Alcorn is describing a type of reader-text exchange in which

both the reader and the text are altered or at least perceived as
altered.

i

During the process of this exchange, communication happens.
Voice seems to be an aspect of written communication that eUcits
an emotional response^ In what way is this emotional response

related to litered meaning? In writing and reading we may seek
understanding on an intellectual level, but to what extent is
meaning altered by our emotional experience?

A primary difference between many critics lies, not only in
the questions that they ask of literature, but in where they
attribute the source of meaning.

It is not only a question of

which possible meaning is the most important or true, but of where
that meaning is generated.

Getting back to the distinction

"green/ sweep," the literal meaning of the phrase does not change.

Numerous words coiild be substituted for green, without changing
the literal meaning Of the sentence -- "my hands don't sweep
across you now" (or 'i'my hands aren't across you now, but green
■ is"). ■

The question is, is literal meaning the sole function of

langua^? If it is, then any discussion about quality or Voice is
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simply inane. Let computers do the writing from now on, and

banish all composition i courses. Literal meaning is apparently

fairly simple, unless ^e include feeling as an aspect of meaning.
Feeling is an importaii|t aspect of language effects. It is the
difference between "getting the chills" from green, and the "ho

hums" from sweep. In Derrida's words "where does this complicity
between sound and ideality^ or rather, between voice and ideality,

come from" ("Speech" 77)? He is referring to the immediacy of
experience with words. At the moment of cognition, the word fades
into the experience that it represents, or means.

As Derrida

explains,

this immediate presence results from the fact that the

phenomenological 'body' of the si^iifier seems to fade
away at the very moment it is produced... this effacement

of the sensible body and its exteriority is for conscious
ness the very form of the immediate presence of the signi
fied" ("Speech 77).

There is a dynamic relationship here between objects (words)
and consciousness (meaning/feeling). Somehow the objects are
imbued by consciousness and, in the same instant, alter that

consciousness. Alcorn addresses this dynamic encounter by
• writingt'

words matter in their particular material signifying
substance— bpth as marks and as sounds.... If it is
clear that the material presence of words matters

enormously to the functions of the self, and especially to
the unconscious functions of the self, then it should also
be clear that critical theory needs to examine how
projective activities are animated by the signifier's
materiality. If texts are not blarik screens for
projections, if instead projections are somehow "filtered"
and networked by a text's signifiers, then we must find
effective terins to describe this process... projective
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processes of reading are modified by textual encounters.
■

Jacques Derrida closely examines this relationship in Of

Grammatologv. What he really examines is our relationship to or

with language. The qluestion of voice revolves not only around the
relationship between the reader and the writer, but can be more

precisely examined by studying the relationship of each to
language. What is language, and how does our concept of language
determine what we are able to perceive or "hear"?

What are the

conventions of language that influence or limit the questions we

ask of language —- that determine our experience of language?
There are numereus approaches we could take in exploring this
question, but the theories of Jacques Lacan are particularly
evocative. In her essay on voice, Susan Dodd writes, "Freud noted

that 'writing was in its origin the voice of an absent person'"
(80), Lacan tSkes the ball of absence (so to speak), and runs

with it.

For Lacan, language itself is evoked from a primal sense

of absence. IhsteSd of thinking of language eis representative of
existential phenomena, language is in fact evocative (a word which

is interestingly enough, derived from the latinate root^"

which means voice) with regard to such phenomena.
For each individual, language begins early in life in what

Lacan refers to as the mirror stage (stade du miroir). As Anthony
Wilden explains.

The "mirror phase" derives its name from the importance
of mirror relationships in childhood. The significance of
children's attempts to appropriate or control their own
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image in a mix^ror is that their actions are symptomatic of
these deeper relationships. Through his perception of the
image of another human being, the child discovers a form
(Gestalt), a corporeal unity... (160)

Essentially, by discovering such a "corporeal unity," which
the child identifies as a self, the child also recognizes the
distinction between that self and that which is other than self.

It recognizes within itself the absence of the "other," who is
usually the mother.

Wilden further explsdns that

Lacan would view the newborn child as an "absolute

subject" in a totally intransitive relationship to the
world he cannot yet distinguish from himself.

For the

object to lae discovered by the child it must be
absent....since identification is itself dependent upon
the discovery:of difference, itself a kind of

absense....[For] Lacan, the "lack of object" is the gap in
the signifying chain which the subject seeks to fill at
the level of the signifier. (163-64)

According to Lacan, language springs from our need for a sort
of reunification with 'rotheri" We use the signifier, or word, to
"call forth" the otheri ahd hopefully, the other's desire.
If we take Lacan's theory as actusility, and we all experience
a primal need for harmony or reuhification with an "other," it is
easy to see how we might create such an other in the

reading/writing experience, which is solely linguistic. Language
is evoked out of what Lacan terms the desire for the desire of

another. All writing is done in language. Hence, writing and
reading (one cannot exist without the other) are likewise the
result of our desire for the desire of another. It would seem

that we indeed are reacting to an existential dilenuna when we talk
about voice in writing.

We really do want to believe there is
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another speaking and jthat we are not alone in our experience.
Lacan's conceptipn of language seems to be in

direct

conflict with that posited by Plato some two thousand years ago.
Plato's conception of reahty is based upon an ideal exteriority,
and what we call reality is a mere shadow of that ideal existence.

For Plato, this ideal 1 is what we refer to when we speak. It is

that which our spoken words signify, but which we can never at
tain.

Rise Axelrod addressed this in her discussion of voice at

the 1986 CCCC, when she stated that "we associate voice with the

truth of mind and thing, an association that goes back to Plato.
The logocentt'ic tradition of Greco^Ghristian onto-theOlogy valor
izes voice and gives it its power" (16).

In this logocentric

traditioni writihg is represehtatiye of spoken language, (which in
turn is symbolic of the ideal "signified"), so writing of the

highest qufiility will be that which most resembles the spoken word.
It wiU be that which we most easily ''hear," as if a living voice
is speaking it.

Such subbrdinatfbn of wtdting to the spoken word has its
roots buried deep within the history, even genesis, of human

logic. Our quest for voice in writing may be nothing more than
logocentric tendencies so deeply embedded in our conception of
reality that we are no longer even conscious of them. It is more
correctly stated that bur conception of reality is imbedded

within our logocentricity.

Derrida writes, jthat in a logocentric reality.
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The writteri signifier is always technical and repre
sentative. It has no constitutive meaning... The notion
of the sign always implies within itself the distinction
between signifier and signified... this notion remains
therefore within the heritage of...[the] absolute proximi

ty of voice and being, of voice and meaning of being, of
voice and the 'ideality of meaning. (11-12)
Written words are one step removed from spoken words.

Spoken

words have a direct relationship with our own state of being,
consciousness and mea,ning of consciousness.
traced to Aristotle.

This thinking can be

Derrida writes, "if^ for Aristotle, for

example, 'spoken words (ta en te phone) are the symbols of mental
experience (pathematai tes psyches) and written words are the

s3nnbols of spoken wohds'

interpretation, 1, 16a 3) it is

because the voice, producer of the first symbols, has a relation

ship of essential and immediate proximity with the mind" (11).
The quest for voice in writing is a quest for that direct link
with consciousness,

i

But Such thinking is faulty.

We are looking for voice as a

derivative of language. But our conception of language, particu

larly written languajgej as something that we create as a tool or
symbol, is the antithesis of what we actually experience when we
experience voice in waiting.

We think of lan^age as functioning from within (mind), then
through external channels (speech/air or writing/ink), to be

processed or understood by the within (mind) of an other. But

this notion totedly excludes the relationship of that "within"
with what we call external reality. Perhaps the "fault" (if we
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can call it such) origihates in our use of the metaphor voice.

By

using this metaphor, vie essentially equate spoken word with writ
ten, robbing the written of its distinct qualities, when in fact
what we mean to equate is spoken words with the effect of written.

Sometimes we experience having been "spoken" to when we read, as
if we actually heard the words pronounced by another.

But what if

this effect is actually quite distinct from that which we
experience with spoken words?

Derrida writes that metaphor in

general is "the passagb from one existent to another" ("Writing"
27). What is the other existent that we refer to when we speak of

"voice" in written material?

By analogy, let us say that spoken

words are the equivalent of ydnd and written words are the move-^
ment of the leaves of the trees.

The movement of leaves does not

represent wind unless we say it does. The movement of leaves is
the moyement of leaves. We say this movement is the

same as

wind, when in fact it is spmething altogether distinct from wind.
Consider also the written transcript of a conversation.

Such

a transcript rarely cohveys "presence" such as we speak of when we
speak of voice.

Often transcribed conversations are confusing and

dull and require special interpretive allowances in order to
understand them. They do not follow the conventions that are
unique to written discourse.

Likewise, writing a dialogue is

often considered one of the most difficult tasks for the fiction

writer, who needs to make a conversation seem real while still

employing the conventions of writing.

42

These examples alone indi

cate there is a property in writing that is not a consideration
when we speak.

i

It's interesting tp note that we do not use voice as a quali

tative judgement with regard to spoken language. Of a great orator

we do not say that hp or she speaks with voice. Such a statement
seems absurd.

Martin Luther King did not speak with voice as,

say, Coleridge wrote with voice.
voice of the oppressed.

Instead we say King was the

Speakers are articulate or powerful or

energetic, but they do not have voice. Voice in writing is not
voice in oratory, and in fact what we call voice in Writing may be
impossible to duplicate in speech.

1 tried to think of speakers

who struck me as Unipue or powerful, and then asked whether 1

could equate my feeling of listening to them with the feeling 1

have when 1 read writing that has voice. Pa3?ticular teachers came
to mind, even famous:speakers like Ghandi or John Kennedy^

They

were all articulate, ahd there Was a sense of them being fully con

scious or present as they speak. Somehow they were able to remain
individual, to retain unique personalities while spesddng before

crowds of people. 1 can see similarities in listening to these
speakers and reading writers who "have found their voice."

How

ever, if a reader responds to my writing by saying that I am

articulate, even powerful, he is sa3ring something different than
if he says I have voice, or 1 have found my voice. What is the
quality that these great spe£dcers have in common with writers who
have voice?

43

The equation of wpiting with speech or subordination of
writing to speech, such logocentricity, is what Derrida calls an

"ethnocentric metaphysics" (Of Grammatology 79), that is unique to
Western culture.

Chinese characters, for example, are not

phonetically oriented and cahriot thus be linked directly with

speech. Chinese writing is symbolic and distinct from speech.
Similarly, mathematics is a non-spoken language. Derrida quotes
the historian Feyrier as writing "[mathematics] is a sort of
universal language,i. it is writing, so badly misunderstood, that

takes the place of lan^age, after having been its servant" ("Of
Gram" 83).

Gary Zukav discusses the problem of operating within

two distinct language systems when he writes about Einstein's

difficulties expressing linquistieally what he had written, or
come to understahd, mathematically.

Zukav explains, that Einstein

had to make a "translation from one language to another.

The

original language is in^thematics and the second language is

English. The problem is that there is simply no way of precisely

expressing what the first language says in terms of the second
language" (150) The problem with such translation is that English
is phonetically based, while mathematics is symbolic or conceptual
in nature, and distinct from any spoken language.

As such, math

ematics is, to a certsdn degree, also distinct from spoken/heard
thought. The truly interesting question is, is it possible to
mathematically write with "voice?" If writing is truly distinct

from speech, and "voice" is an exclusive quality in writing, then
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it would seem plausible to have a corollary quality for voice in

mathematics.

If so, we have misnamed that quality "voice," and

must create or more properly re-name a new term to distinguish
that quality.

Let us say for a moment that the answer is yes, there is
"voice" in mathematical language. The difficulty with this is
that we cannot conceptualize a reality in which voice is not the

approximation or signification of being. There is no "being" who
speaks mathematics, so we cannot conceive of mathematical writing
as having "voice." Mathematics represents "things" or concepts,

not "being." Voice is in direct correlation to being, we think.

I asked a friend. Who is a mathematician, what he thought. He
said there are mathematical theorums that carry a certain power

over other theorems. They have greater quality.

This sense of

quality usually applies to those theorems which can be applied
globally or more generally, and not just to a particular circum
stance.

Mathematicians do not, however, refer to such theorems

as having voice.

There is other language that is strictly written.

The new

international pictoral signs that adorn the streets of most cities
are a sort of writing without words. In most countries now, one

crosses the street after a green, walking figurine appears on the

traffic light.

But is this a written language?

Mathematics is not a pure language.

Mathematicians rarely

write exclusively in mathematical terms. They use their spoken,
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native languages for ahalytic commentary and explanation.
It appears that when we speak of voice in writing, we are

speaking of a quality that is unique to phonetic writing. Derrida
writes "phonetic writing, however abstract and arbitrary, retained

some relationship vdth the presence of the represented voice, to

its possible presence in. general and therefore to that of a cer
tain passion" (Of Grammatplbgy 312). A "certain passion" is that
for which we use the imetaphor voice.
Voice, Uke skill, is what Robert Pirsig might call a modem

ghost.

He writes.
Within that context of thought, ghosts and spirits are

quite as real ks atoms, particles, photons and quanta are
to modern man ... what I'm driving at... is the notion

that before the beginning of the earth, before the sun and
the stars were formed} before the primal generation of
anything, not in anyone's mind because there wasn't any
one, this law of gravity existed?...the law of gravity and
gravity itself did hot exist before Isaac Newton... and

what that means is that the law of gravity exists nowhere
except in people's heads! It's a ghost! (32-33)

As such, the donning of voice, is essentially the creation of
voice.

Our relationship with reality is hot what we pretend it to

be. We essentially create our reality through language. Period.

Speaking becomes a metaplior for creating. To speak of voice, is
to speek in language.' To speak it is to create it. We speak
"chair" whenever we sit on a construction of wood or aluminum that

has a flat, horizontal surface and three or four legs to hold our

weight. Gary Zukav quotes Albert Einstein as having written "phy-^
sical concepts are free creations of the human mind, and are not,
however it may seem, uniquely determined by the external world" (8),
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The fact that voice is a mental creation does not, however,
make it less real.

Voice is no less real than quality or skill.

To langtiage "voice" is to inhabit the world of m5rthos.
to discuss the experience of voice, not the concept.
writes

We want

Gary Zukav

that "the difference between experience and s5mibol is the

difference between mjdihos and logos" (261).
M3rthos seems to be anything that does not easily sit within
the realm of logical, systematic thought.

Our own logocentricity

includes reasoning that sees the world as a system.

All reality

operates within the system of logic and in order to understand
that which does not yet make sense, we need to find the missing
"hnk" in the chain of logic.

It is such logic that sees language

as representative of reality, speech as a representation of

language and writing as a representation of speech.
complete.

The chain is

Such a view of communication makes sense.

The only

major problem with this is that the world, and experience in
particular, does not operate according to our own systematic

ordering.

Zukav addresses this problem when he writes,

Logos imitates, but can never replace, experience. It
is a substitute for experience. Logos is the artificial
construction of...S3nnbols which mimics experience on a
one-to-one basis... Mythos points toward experience, but
it does not replace experience... a language of mythos...
is the true language of physics. This is because...

language...[and] also mathematics, follows a certain set
of rules (ck^sical logic). Experience itself is not
bound by these rules♦. .[mythos] is based not upon the way
that we think of things, but upon the way that we ex
perience them. (282-63)
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To try and operate exclusively within either mythos or logos

would be nothing short of suicide, or insanity. It is important
to acknowledge how the two thinking processes conjoin.
superior to the other.

Neither is

Robert Pirsig writes that logos "refers to

the sum total of our rational understanding of the world," while
mythos "is the sum total of the early historic and prehistoric

mjdihs which preceded the logos" (343).

As such, logocentric

thought cannot help but be influenced by mythlogic thought.

Our

logocentricity in turn, creates a new mythology — it creates new
ghosts, such as voice.

An aspect of our new mjrthology that is easily traced to

logical thought, is the notion that we create language, and
language is a tool for communication when in fact we are in part,

if not en toto, created by language. "In the beginning was the

tVORD." At first glance, this statement seems easy to refute. It
is in fact more complicated than we first assume.

Robert Pattison

quotes Helen Keller as writing:

Before my teabher came to me, I did not know that I am.
I lived in a world that was a no-world. I cannot hope to
describe adeqluately that unconscious yet conscious time of
nothingness. I did not know that I knew aught, or that I
lived or acted or desired.

I had neither will nor intel

lect.... Since I had no power of thought, I did not com
pare one mental state with another.

So I was not con

scious of any change or process going on in my brain when
my teacher began to instruct me... when I learned the
meaning of "I" and "me" and found that I was something, I
began to think.

Then consciousness first existed for me.

(11)
In fact Helen Keller did not exist for herself until she

acquired, or (more accurately stated) was created by language.
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She may have existed; for others, but these others already
possessed language capabiUties.
out an interior?

How can an exterior exist with

Nothing, including herself, existed for Helen

Keller until language existed/created.

As Pattison writes, "to be

conscious of oneself a;s a user of language... is to begin to take

the measure of creatidn" (12). Similarly, Julian Jajmes writes
that "consciousness [hence, self], is the invention of an analog
world on the basis of;language... consciousness comes after
language!" (66)
We know that a system does not exist until we construct it.

Aristotle's "method" of rhetoric is likewise a constructed system
-- a kind of map which we can use to produce the effects that we
want.

The problem with our use of rhetoric is that we've for

gotten it was intended as a map. Rise Axelrod explained that "our
way of understanding the world is an ideology which pretends to
itself that it is not an ideology at all" (16).
ideology?

But what is this

Where does the map of rhetoric lead us?

directs us toward something.

This map

What is that something?

What is the

essence of rhetoric?

William Stafford once wrote, "one who composes in

language moves in the presence of sound... breathes with a set of

muscles that will clutter or enhance the ever-varying physical

presence of language effects" (55). This chapter began with a
quote from Marshall Alcorn regarding "the forces attached to
words that generate, employ, or 'bind' emotion,"
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There seems to

be a dynamiq interraction between language forces and language ef
fects.

The writer tries to somebow harness the creative forces of

language, while the reader is engaged in an exchange with the
"ever varying physical presence of language effects." This force
which we attribute to;language, and the effect we receive from
language, are as close as we can get to the notion of voice.
Voice is a qualitative measure of language force and language
effect.

What the map of rhetoric ideally leads to, is voice.

Commonly rhetoric is viewed as a method, as form, as logos.
has dominated substance, logos over mythos.

Form

Rhetoric is the

logos, voice is the mjHhos.
Interestingly enough, if we go back and take a look at the
model of our circumscription for voice, it could easily substitute
as a circumscription for rhetoric in its ideal form.

Both occur

only within the contekt of a human relationship that is deeply

imbedded in language!. James Kinneavy in his Theory of Discourse,
explores in great detml such a model of rhetoric.

For Kinneavy,

such a model is the foundation for discourse theory.

Such a model

may also be key to our gaining insight into a theory of voice.

When the first rhetoricians were laying out their methods,
they had an ideal in mind.

attain this ideal.

The purpose of their method was to

This ideal might be defined as new conscious

ness for a listener or reader.

The experience of voice, is the

experience of donning new awareness or consciousness, if only for

a very short time, created out of a quality presence of language
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